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PLAYING THE PERCENTAGES: A RE-EXAMINATION
OF RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF CHANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Olsen, a forty-five year old attorney, was experiencing
some urinary problems and physical discomfort. When she visited
her physician, Dr. Slack, he examined her, ran a few tests, and told
her not to worry. Her discomfort continued so she later returned to
the doctor, who repeated the same procedure. Finally, nine months
after her initial visit, her condition had not improved and she con-
sulted another physician, Dr. Doktor. He found that she had a form
of bladder cancer, that her cancer had advanced to the Stage Two
type and that it was well on its way to Stage Three. He told her that
cancer is often fatal and that currently only eighteen percent of those
with Stage Three tumors recover. He also told her that had her con-
dition been diagnosed six months earlier, it would only have been a
Stage One tumor and her chance of recovery at that stage would
have been thirty-seven percent. This information caused Mrs. Olsen
severe emotional distress for the rest of her life. In addition, because
of the advanced stage of her cancer, she required a more extensive
and painful treatment than that applied to Stage One patients. Mrs.
Olsen eventually succumbed to the cancer.
Can Mrs. Olsen's estate recover for the nineteen percent chance
of recovery she lost as a result of Dr. Slack's negligence or for the
additional mental anguish she suffered? Can the estate recover for
the additional pain and suffering she experienced, for unnecessary
medical expenses, or for her lost earnings? In most jurisdictions' the
answer to these questions is "no." Despite Dr. Slack's malpractice,
Mrs. Olsen's estate cannot recover damages relating to her lost
chance and additional injuries.
Courts have traditionally viewed loss of chance as an aspect of
wrongful death.2 In a wrongful death action, the death itself is
© 1986 by Jonathan D. Wolf
1. Currently no jurisdictions recognize a separate and independent cause of action for
loss of chance. However, a number of courts have relaxed the traditional causation require-
ments in order to allow plaintiffs suffering injuries connected with loss of chance to reach the
jury. For an explanation of these and other loss of chance cases, see infra note 95.
2. See King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Pre-Existing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1363 (1981).
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viewed as the injury.' Compensation for loss of chance is allowed
only if the plaintiff proves that the lost chance of recovery proxi-
mately caused the victim's death.4
The major hurdle for the plaintiff in these cases is establishing
the causation element.' In order to recover any damages, the plaintiff
must prove that the doctor's negligence was the actual cause of the
patient's death." Thus, if the patient would have died as a result of
the illness despite the negligence, wrongful death, and hence loss of
chance recovery, is generally denied.
7
However, a few commentators? have advocated adopting a sepa-
rate cause of action for negligent deprivation of a chance of recovery.
This new tort, called loss of chance, would compensate the victim or
his estate for the loss of a statistically verifiable opportunity to re-
cover from illness. The loss of chance tort defines the injury as the
lost chance of recovery. The lost chance is considered a separate
injury from the death.10
If a cause of action for loss of chance existed, Mrs. Olsen's es-
tate could bring suit for compensation for the nineteen percent
chance of recovery she lost as a result of Dr. Slack's malpractice.
This figure is obtained by determining what her chance of recovery
would have been had the initial diagnosis been made correctly
(thirty-seven percent), and subtracting from that figure the chance of
recovery that existed when the illness was properly diagnosed (eigh-
teen percent).11
A lost chance of recovery arises in many contexts of the medical
3. See S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 2.2, at 66-67 (1975).
4. King, supra note 2, at 1364-68; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for
the Loss of Chance, 28 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121, 123 (1982).
5. See King, supra note 2, at 1363-64.
6. S. SPEISER, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 66-67.
7. See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984);
Confeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980); Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608,
612, 617 P.2d 774, 778 (1980); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d
242, 250, 272 N.E.2d 97, 102 (1971). But see O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir.
1971); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
8. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 117-23 (1935); King,
supra note 2; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 4.
9. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 631-
32, 664 P.2d 474, 485-86; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 117-123; King, supra note 2, at
1363; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 4, at 129.
10. See King, supra note 2, at 1363-64.
11. A major hurdle for the plaintiff in a loss of chance case is valuing the chance that
was lost. Plaintiffs usually place a value on loss of chance through the aid of economic experts,
medical experts, and the jury's conscience.
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malpractice field. 2 This comment focuses on loss of chance cases
that arise from a doctor's misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose the ill-
ness of a patient who eventually dies from that illness."' After a brief
discussion of causation, this comment then examines three current
approaches to the loss of chance actions. The policies and legal prin-
ciples behind each approach are presented. The inadequacies of each
are analyzed and finally, a different, pragmatic method to handle
these situations is offered for consideration.
12. See Grody v. Tulin, 170 Conn. 443, 365 A.2d 1076 (1976) (failure to perform
timely surgery possibly caused patient a loss of chance); Morgenroth v. Pacific Med. Center,
Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976) (informed consent); Betenbaugh v.
Princeton Hosp., 50 N.J. 390, 235 A.2d 889 (1967) (failure to take complete x-rays).
13. A victim should be entitled to compensation regardless of whether he or she is living
or deceased, and regardless of whether the defendant's negligence caused the victim's death.
The loss of chance should be a compensable cause of action in its own right, available to either
the victim or his estate. It seems blatantly unfair to require that the victim pursue a cause of
action while he is alive, and yet bar his estate from seeking compensation if the victim's biolog-
ical clock (which is shortened by the doctor's malpractice) runs out before the slow and cum-
bersome legal process is completed. This will encourage defendants to pursue the morbid strat-
egy of delaying the trial until the victim dies in order to escape loss of chance liability.
But see Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984) (Handler, J., concurring).
Evers involved a related concept called increased risk of recurrence. In a case involving in-
creased risk, the physician's negligence causes the patient an increased risk that the illness will
recur sometime in the future. The Evers majority held that
A plaintiff should be permitted to demonstrate, within a reasonable degree of
medical probability, that the . . . delay resulting from defendant's failure to
have made an accurate diagnosis and to have rendered proper treatment in-
creased the risk of recurrence or of distant spread of plaintiff's cancer, and that
such increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the condition from
which plaintiff currently suffers.
Id. at 417, 471 A.2d at 415.
Justice Handler concurred specially to address the issue of whether such an increased risk
of recurrence can constitute a compensable injury even though the harm was not manifested.
After endorsing most of the majority's holding, Justice Handler criticized the majority for
requiring an actual manifestation of harm in addition to the increased risk caused by the
defendant:
I do not believe, however, that [actual recurrence of] harm constitutes a "sine
qua non," a condition precedent before there can be recovery for an actual albeit
unquantified increase in the risk of such harm. The court is here troubled by a
seeming inability to quantify the risk of future cancer. But, adding the incur-
rence of future harm as a requirement for the recovery for such increased risk
does not resolve the dilemma since the risk remains unquantified. Yet, insistence
that the harm occur as a condition for recovery does unfortunately add greatly to
the legal burden of cancer victims. The inadvertent effect of such a court rule is
that those victims, who undeservedly have been put in greater peril in terms of
their survival, are not permitted to be compensated for this peril unless they
have suffered a resurgence of their cancer.
Id. at 421, 471 A.2d at 417.
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II. CAUSATION
Generally, causation 4 refers to the connection between the de-
fendant's alleged conduct and the plaintiff's alleged injuries." The
mere occurrence of an injury is insufficient to establish the defend-
ant's liability. 6 Rather, a close relationship between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's injuries must be shown in order to hold
the defendant liable for those injuries. 17 This close relationship, or
causation, is an expression of both the requirements and limits that
society and the courts place on the consequences arising from a de-
fendant's conduct.' These requirements and limits are based on pol-
icy, social justice, and practicality. 9 Generally, society is reluctant to
hold a defendant liable simply because a plaintiff has been injured.
Consequently, the plaintiff is required to show that the defendant's
conduct actually caused, or at least substantially contributed to, the
plaintiff's injuries.2 Once this causal connection is established, cau-
sation also determines the extent to which the defendant can be held
responsible.2 '
Causation thus contains two components, actual cause22 and
proximate cause.23 Actual cause refers to the relationship between
the actor's conduct and the actual injury. 4 Actual cause exists when,
without the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's injury either never
would have occurred or the identical result would not have fol-
lowed. 5 Proximate cause refers to the limitations which courts have
placed upon a defendant's responsibility for the consequences of his
14. Some courts apply the "but for" test to determine if causation exists. For an exam-
ple of this view of actual cause see Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St.
2d 242, 252-53, 272 N.E.2d 97, 103-04 (1971). Some courts apply the "substantial factor"
test. For an example of this view see Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 264, 392 A.2d 1280,
1284 (1978). See also infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
15. W. KEETON, D. Dons, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984).
16. See RwsrA'EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430, comment a (1965). See also Hamil
v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 264, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978).
17. RES't'A'EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
18. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 264.
19. Id. § 31, at 173; § 41, at 264.
20. RS'rTIAEMEN'r (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
21. W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 264-65.
22. Actual cause is also called cause in fact. See id.
23. Proximate cause is also called legal cause. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 263.
24. See C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS, Ch. VII, §2, at 155
(1980).
25. For a discussion of actual cause see A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF Ac-
TUAL CAUSAT1ON (1961).
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conduct.2 6 The defendant's liability is usually limited to the risks
that foreseeably could flow from the conduct.27
A. Tests for Actual Cause
Courts currently hold two views of the issue of causation in
cases involving a loss of chance. Generally, courts apply either the
"but for" or the "substantial factor" test in evaluating actual cause.2 8
The original approach to actual cause is the "but for" test. 9 Under
this test, the defendant is liable for negligence only if, but for his
conduct, the injury would not have occurred." Conversely, the de-
fendant's conduct is not the actual cause of an injury if the injury
would have occurred even without his acts.s" For example, suppose
an obstetrician examines a pregnant woman and negligently deter-
mines that she does not need a caesarean section. As a result, the
baby dies during childbirth and the mother suffers physical and
mental injuries. Assuming a duty and breach have been established,
there can be little doubt that "but for" the doctor's misdiagnosis, the
plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred.
Problems arise, however, when more than one cause contributes
to the plaintiff's injury or when any one of several causes could pro-
duce the identical result."' To meet these problems, courts apply the
"substantial factor" test."3 Under this test, a defendant may be held
26. W. KrTON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 264.
27. Id. § 43 at 284. See Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Deprivation of Chance to
Service Action in Kansas, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 431, 432 n. 13 (1985). See also infra note 158
and accompanying text. But see Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1952). The
following causation discussion is primarily limited to actual cause. Proximate cause is not a
major problem in cases involving a loss of chance. The main difficulty for a plaintiff in such
cases is establishing actual cause. Once actual cause is established, juries have little difficulty in
finding proximate cause. Thus, proximate cause will not be discussed.
28. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 265-68;
RESTArMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 423 (1965). Restatement of Torts § 432(1) states the
"but for" test and § 432(2) is the "substantial factor" test. See Note, Should Lack of Diagnosis
Resulting in Loss of Chance Be A Compensable Injury?, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 508
(1972). Other rules for establishing actual cause are based on peculiar fact patterns. As they
are not germane to the loss of chance area, they will not be discussed. See Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (concurrent proximate cause); Sindel v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (multiple torfeasors).
29. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 266-
67.
30. Id. at § 41, at 266.
31. Id. at 265; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432; B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT,
THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 147 (1959).
32. W. KEETON, D. DoasS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 266-67;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 and comment d.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 432(2), 433; W. KEETON, D, DOBBS, W.
19861
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liable for conduct which substantially contributes to the plaintiff's
injury."' For example, suppose a patient complains of coughing and
respiratory difficulties. The doctor orders chest x-rays, which are
negative. The normal procedure is to have the patient undergo a
bronchoscopy in order to rule out lung cancer, but the doctor negli-
gently fails to order this test and diagnoses the problem as a mere
cough. The coughing persists, but the doctor still performs no bron-
choscopy. Eventually, another doctor diagnoses lung cancer, but by
that time the cancer has metastasized. As a result, the patient dies.
Considering the seriousness of the disease, it cannot be said that "but
for" the doctor's negligence, the patient would have lived. However,
the malpractice certainly appears to be a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the patient's injury.
Demonstrating actual cause is not always as simple as the fore-
going examples may suggest. The plaintiff must establish actual
cause by the applicable standard of proof.38 Moreover, there may be
limitations on the types of evidence which the plaintiff can use to
establish actual cause. 86
B. Standard of Proof
In a medical malpractice action, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove actual cause by the applicable standard of proof."' The tradi-
tional standard of proof in these actions is by a "preponderance of
the evidence."38 The preponderance standard requires the plaintiff to
prove that it is more likely than not that the defendant caused his
injury.3 9 In other words, the plaintiff must establish a greater than
fifty percent probability that the defendant's actions were the actual
cause of the plaintiff's injury. The preponderance standard is almost
always applied in medical malpractice cases,' although occasionally,
KEET'ON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 266-68. The substantial factor rule was devel-
oped by Professor Jeremiah Smith. See Smith, Legal Cause in Actions in Tort, 25 HARV. L.
REv. 103, 223, 303 (1912).
34. RESI71ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 267-68.
35. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
37. B. SHARrEL & M. PLANT, supra note 31, at 147.
38. W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 38 at 239-40.
See Rosenberg, The Causal Connections in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984).
39. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 319 (1954); W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KIEON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 269.
40. B. SHARTEI. & M. PLANT, supra note 31, at 147.
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other standards of proof have been used. 1
Courts favor the preponderance standard because it limits the
jury's ability to speculate on the issue of actual cause.42 While some
speculation is inherent in any standard of proof,4 the preponderance
standard at least requires the plaintiff to prove what probably hap-
pened. Lower standards of proof do not reach this probability level
and the jury must guess what might have happened had the defend-
ant not been negligent.44
The role of the jury is closely related to the standard of proof
required in medical malpractice cases."' The jury usually determines
actual cause and other factual issues.4 Therefore, the important role
of the jury will be examined.
C. Roles of the Jury and Judge in Determining Actual Cause
Traditionally, courts have treated the issue of causation as a
question of fact.47 In theory, the jury, in its role as fact-finder, is
supposed to determine the existence of both actual and proximate
cause."' In practice, the judge usually does not allow a case to reach
the jury if he decides that the plaintiff has not proved actual cause.
In these circumstances, the court has the power of non-suit or to
direct a verdict for the defendant.49
Some courts have deviated from traditional causation principles
in loss of chance cases. In these courts, the role of the jury is affected
by this deviation. The way these principles are applied and the role
played by the jury depends on how courts define a loss of chance
injury. Thus, the different judicial views of what constitutes a loss of
chance injury have yielded different approaches and procedures for
implementing these views.
41. See Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664
P.2d 474 (1983); Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978); Kallenberg v. Beth
Israel Hosp. 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974); McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72
(9th Cir. 1972); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
42. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 251, 272
N.E.2d 97, 103 (1971); W. KEETON, D. DoeBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, §
41, at 269.
43. See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67-68 (1956).
44. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41 at 269.
45. See Malone, supra note 43, at 67-68.
46. Id. at 61-68.
47. Id. at 60.
48. Id.
49. W. KEETON, D. DOBB, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 41 at 269.
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III. CURRENT APPROACHES To CASES INVOLVING Loss OF
CHANCE
Currently, courts and commentators have taken three ap-
proaches to cases involving a loss of chance. These approaches differ
significantly with respect to the various issues involved in loss of
chance situations.
A. Traditional Approach
A majority of jurisdictions follow the traditional approach to re-
covery for loss of chance. Under the traditional view, the victim's
death is the injury,50 and loss of chance is treated as a part of that
injury. 1 An action must be brought under the applicable wrongful
death statute. 52  A successful plaintiff recovers damages for the
wrongful death in general and not specifically for the loss of chance.
Specific damages for loss of chance can be recovered only if the
plaintiff proves the loss of chance probably caused the decedent's
death."3
Courts adopting this approach apply the traditional actual
cause test, the "but for" analysis.' 4 These courts also require the
plaintiff to meet the normal "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard of proof." Under this standard, the plaintiff must show that
there was a greater than fifty percent chance that the doctor's negli-
gence was the actual cause of the victim's death."' Put another way,
if the patient probably' 7 would have died from his illness, then no
50. See King, supra note 2, at 1363-65.
51. Id.
52. Action may also be brought under a survivorship action. For the purposes of this
comment, survivorship actions will be treated as within the wrongful death area.
53. See King, 5upra note 2, at 1365. See also Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., 445
So. 2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980);
Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 612, 617 P.2d 774, 778 (1980); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity
of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 252, 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (1971).
54. Note, supra 28, at 508.
55. See supra note 38.
56. As some commentators succinctly state, even a 50% chance is inadequate:
The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough;
and when . . . the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty
of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
W. KE T'oN, D. Doaas, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, 1] 41, at 269.
57. Probability is defined in this context and throughout this comment as that which is
more likely than not. See Clark v. Welch, 140 F.2d 271, 273 (1944); In re Saloman's Estate,
159 Misc. 379, 384, 287 N.Y.S. 814, 820-21 (1936).
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matter how negligent the doctor was and no matter how much
greater the chance of survival he would have had without the negli-
gence, the doctor will not be held liable for his death."
The plaintiff can usually meet the preponderance standard of
proof by producing any evidence that tends to make the existence or
non-existence of any material fact more or less probable. 9 The evi-
dence must show it is more likely than not that the patient died as a
result of the defendant's negligence.60 As in any negligence action,
the evidence must rise above speculation and conjecture.61 Most ju-
risdictions require expert medical testimony concerning both the lost
chance and the probability that the negligence caused the victim's
death."' If the plaintiff establishes actual cause by a preponderance
of the evidence, the jury will decide whether the doctor should be
held liable.63
The leading case propounding the traditional approach is
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati."' In Cooper, a mother
brought a wrongful death action on behalf of her son, a sixteen year-
old boy. Her son was hit by a truck while riding a bicycle.6" The
boy could move around unaided when he was brought to the hospi-
tal, but he was suffering from headaches and vomiting.6" Attention
was called to an injury at the back of the boy's head, but the doctor
did not examine the injury, did not take his vital signs, did not use
an opthalmoscope, and did not perform a Romberg test.6 If any of
these procedures had been performed, the injury would have been
detected and surgery would have been performed. However, the boy
was released from the hospital and he died early the next morning of
a basal skull fracture, intracranial pressure and hemorrhaging.6"
58. The proponents of this approach have quoted the legalese of Davis v. Goarnieri, 45
Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887), as justification for requiring a preponderance standard: "It
is legally and logically impossible for it to be probable that a fact exists, and at the same time
probable that it does not exist." Id. at 490, 15 N.E. at 361.
59. FED. R. EVID. 401.
60. See supra note 53.
61. J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 663, at 776-77 (3d ed. 1940).
62. W. KEETON, D. DOBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 38 at 240; B.
SHARTEI.L & M. PLANT, supra note 31, at 147. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 924 (1970); Annot.,
18 A.L.R.3d 22-23, 101-102, 183-85 (1970).
63. See generally Bearman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 186 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir. 1951);
B. SHARrEL & M. PLANT, supra note 31, at 147-49; Branch, Misdiagnosis of Cancer and
Loss of Chance, 30 AM. JUR. TRIALS 237, 355 & nn.98-99 (1983).
64. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
65. Id. at 242, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
66. Id. at 243, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 244-45, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
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The plaintiff's medical expert testified that the doctor failed to
follow the normal procedures for examining a patient with this type
of injury6' and that without surgical intervention there was a one
hundred percent mortality rate for such injuries."0 He also testified:
"there certainly is a chance and I can't say exactly what-maybe
someplace around fifty percent-that he would have survived with
surgery.''1 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this testimony as
proof of actual cause72 and also specifically rejected the idea of com-
pensation for the negligent deprivation of a loss of chance.78
Thus, under the traditional approach, a plaintiff cannot recover
damages for a loss of chance unless he proves that the defendant
caused the patient's death. Often, as in Cooper, this means that the
plaintiff cannot recover, despite clear negligence on the part of the
defendant.
B. Substantial Possibility Approach
A few jurisdictions have held that the traditional approach leads
to unfair results in cases involving a loss of chance. These courts do
not apply the traditional "but for" test to prove actual cause in loss
of chance cases. Instead, these courts use a "substantial possibility"
approach.7 4 Under this view, the plaintiff can reach the jury on the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
71. Id.
72. The court stated:
In an action for wrongful death, where medical malpractice is alleged as
the proximate cause of death, and plaintiff's evidence indicates that a failure to
diagnose the injury prevented the patient from an opportunity to be operated on,
which failure eliminated any chance of the patient's survival, the issue of proxi-
mate cause can be submitted to a jury only if there is sufficient evidence showing
that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery the patient would probably
have survived.
Id. at 253-54, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
The court also rejected out-of-hand the substantial possibility approach. See infra notes
75-94 and accompanying text. The court stated:
A rule which would permit a plaintiff to establish a jury question on the
issue of proximate cause upon a showing of a "substantial possibility" of sur-
vival, in our judgment, suffers the same infirmity as a rule which would permit
proof of a chance of recovery to be sufficient. While the substantial possibility
concept appears to connote a weightier burden than the chance of recovery idea,
both derogate well-established and valuable proximate cause considerations.
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinati, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 251, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
73. "[Lloss of chance of recovery, standing alone, is not an injury from which damages
will flow." Id. at 250, 272 N.E.2d at 102 (quoting Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 2d 304, 315,
13 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1938)).
74. See King, supra note 2, at 1368.
LOSS OF CHANCE
issue of proximate cause by showing that there was a substantial
possibility that the defendant's negligence was the actual cause of the
patient's injury.""
The courts using this approach apply the substantial factor test
to prove actual cause. 7  This test relieves the plaintiff of the burden
of showing that it was more likely than not that the defendant's neg-
ligence caused the victim's death. Thus, the plaintiff need not estab-
lish that "but for" the malpractice the victim would have lived; he
need only show that the physician's negligence was a substantial fac-
tor in bringing about the injury. If the plaintiff presents evidence
that the doctor's negligence increased the risk of harm to the victim,
and if he shows that the harm was actually sustained, the jury de-
cides whether or not that increased risk was a substantial factor in
producing the patient's harm.7
These courts also lower the standard of proof required to estab-
lish actual cause from a probability (greater that fifty percent) to a
substantial possibility.7 The extent of the possibility depends on the
factual situation in the case. 9
Substantial possibility jurisdictions use the substantial factor test
and a lower standard of proof because they view a loss of chance
injury as an injury which increases the risk of future harm. The
basis for liability for injuries of this type is codified in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 323(a).80 This section
75. Id. See also Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d
609, 613-14, 664 P.2d 474, 476 (1983); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 262, 632 (4th Cir.
1966).
76. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614-17, 664 P.2d at 477-78; Hamil v. Bashline, 481
Pa. 256, 265, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978).
77. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 615, 664 P.2d at 477; Hamil, 481 Pa. at 269, 392 A.2d
at 1286. The Hamil court also held that if the jury finds that sufficient evidence of actual cause
has been presented, then proximate cause is automatically established. Id. at 272, 392 A.2d at
1288.
78. See Note, supra note 28, 519; King, supra note 2, at 1368.
79. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) (14% reduction in chance of
survival sufficient to allow plaintiff to reach the jury); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45
A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974) (per curiam), affid mem., 37 N.Y. 719, 337 N.E.2d
128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975) (20-40% reduction in chance of survival
sufficient to reach the jury).
80. RVSI'ATFMEN'r (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965), states:
One who undertakes . . . to render services to another which he should recog-
nize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of such harm.
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recogniz[es] that a particular class of tort actions, of which [a
loss of chance] is an example, differs from those cases normally
sounding in tort. Whereas typically a plaintiff alleges that a de-
fendant's act or omission set in motion a force which resulted in
harm, the theory of [a loss of chance] case is that the defendant's
act or omission failed in a duty to protect against harm from
another source.81
These courts view section 323(a) as authority to relax the degree of
certainty normally required to permit the plaintiff's evidence to
reach the jury.8" Thus, the substantial possibility approach applies
the substantial factor test and a lower standard of proof to cases in-
volving a loss of chance.
The most recent example of the substantial possibility approach
is Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound.8" In
Herskovits, the decedent's wife brought a survivorship action against
the Cooperative.84 The decedent visited the defendant's hospital nu-
merous times during 1974 to complain of chest pains and coughing.8"
On December 5, 1974, he was diagnosed as having a cough problem
and was treated with cough medicine.86 The hospital made no fur-
ther attempt to treat Mr. Herskovits other than ordering an occa-
sional chest x-ray.87 His condition continued to worsen and he
sought another medical opinion in June 1975.88 It was only then
that his lung cancer was diagnosed.8 9
The plaintiff presented testimony which established that if the
tumor was at Stage One in December 1974, the decedent's chance of
a five-year survival would have been thirty-nine percent. 90 As a re-
sult of the defendant's misdiagnosis, the tumor had progressed to
81. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 615, 664 P.2d at 477; see also Hamil, 481 Pa. at 269,
392 A.2d at 1286.
82. The Hamil court stated;
Such cases by their very nature elude the degree of certainty one would prefer
and upon which the law normally insists before a person may be held liable.
Nevertheless, in order that an actor is not completely insulated because of un-
certainties as to the consequences of his negligent conduct, Section 323(a) tacitly
acknowledges this difficulty and permits the issue to go to the jury upon a less
than normal threshold of proof.
481 Pa. at 271, 392 A.2d at 1287-88.
83. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
84. Id. at 611, 664 P.2d at 475.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
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Stage Two and his chance of a five-year survival had fallen to
twenty-five percent.9 1 The defendant argued that the plaintiff had to
prove a greater than fifty percent chance of survival at the time the
negligence occurred in order to establish liability.92 The court re-
jected this contention. It held that although the decedent would have
had only a thirty-nine percent chance of survival if the negligence
had not occurred, the fourteen percent reduction of his chance of
survival was sufficient evidence of actual cause to allow the causation
issue to go to the jury.9"
On a conceptual level, the substantial possibility approach and
the traditional approach are the same; both view the victim's death
as the injury. However, the substantial possibility approach increases
the plaintiffs chances of showing that the defendant's negligence
caused the victim's death.94 Nonetheless, neither approach recognizes
a separate tort for loss of chance.
C. Compensation Approach
The compensation approach95 proposes a change in the concept
91. Id.
92. Id. at 613, 664 P.2d at 476-77.
93. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476-77.
94. See King, supra note 2, at 1368.
95. A few commentators have advocated establishing a cause of action for loss of chance.
See supra note 8. Professor McCormick and the Wolfstones advocate allowing recovery for loss
of chance, but only Professor King outlines an approach for implementing such a cause of
action. As such, the following description and analysis of the compensation approach is essen-
tially Professor King's approach. See King, supra note 2, at 1382-87; Wolfstone & Wolfstone,
supra note 4, at 129-44; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 117-23.
No cases explicitly advocate compensating a loss of chance directly. Many cases that are
often cited as supporting the adoption of a cause of action for loss of chance actually involve
fact patterns in which the victim would have had a greater than 50% chance of survival, but
lost a substantial percentage of that chance due to the defendant's negligence. See Hamil v.
Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978); McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th
Cir. 1972); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). For an insightful summation
of these and other loss of chance cases see Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 625-37, 664 P.2d at
482-86 (Pearson, J., concurring).
Cases exist in which, arguably, the plaintiff was compensated for the loss of chance itself.
However, these cases appear to be isolated and limited to their specific facts. They propose no
new analysis and do not represent the controlling law in their jurisdictions. See James v.
United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45
A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974); O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971);
Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Jeanes and O'Brien as proximate
cause cases rather than as loss of chance cases. See Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.
1977); Savage v. Christian Hosp. N.W., 543 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1976). James is a federal
district court opinion and has never been expressly adopted or rejected by subsequent cases.
For an explanation of Kallenberg, see Kimball v. Scors, 59 A.D.2d 984, 399 N.Y.S.2d 350
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of loss of chance. Under this view, the lost chance for survival or
recovery constitutes a separate, compensable injury.9 6 Either the pa-
tient or his estate is entitled to bring suit. 97
The justification for this view is stated in a well-known passage
in Hicks v. United States:9"
[W]hen a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as the the measure of the
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If
there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defend-
ant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened
in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to
pass.99
This approach applies the traditional preponderance of the evi-
dence standard of proof."' Thus, the plaintiff would be required to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant negli-
gently deprived the victim of a chance of recovery. If the jury finds
that the defendant's negligence probably caused the decedent to lose
a chance recovery, the plaintiff can recover for the chance that the
defendant destroyed.
Under the compensation approach, the decedent's estate can be
compensated for any damages which flow from the doctor's malprac-
tice even though the decedent probably died as a result of his pre-
existing illness.10 1 These damages could include increased pain due
to aggravation of the injury,'0 2 loss of earnings that he would have
(1977).
The more recent cases purportedly adopting a loss of chance cause of action are actually
cases in which the court merely modifies the causation requirements in order to allow the
plaintiff to reach the jury on a wrongful death or survivorship claim. See Roberson v. Coun-
selman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital,
566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Comment supra, note 27, at 441.
96. See King, supra note 2, at 1376.
97. See id. at 1363-64; see also supra note 13.
98. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
99. Id. at 632.
100. The only comprehensive system for compensating a loss of chance has been pro-
posed by Professor Joseph King. See supra note 95; King, supra note 2, at 1381-96. Professor
King's proposals are primarily concerned with valuation of the lost chance. He does not specif-
ically address the issue of actual cause or several other issues discussed in this comment. How-
ever, he does advocate using the preponderance standard of proof. Id. at 1394-95. See also
supra note 95.
101. King, supra note 2, at 1395.
102. Id. at 1364.
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received had his life expectancy not been shortened,103 mental and
emotional distress resulting from concern over anticipated future
consequences of the malpractice, 0 4 loss of the opportunity for earlier
and more effective treatment,' loss of the opportunity to benefit
from potential scientific break-throughs,0 6 and, of course, loss of the
victim's chance of surviving the illness. 0 7 Any other damages appro-
priate to the loss of chance setting could also be included. Thus, the
compensation approach does not compensate the plaintiff for all the
damages resulting from the decedent's death, but only for those dam-
ages flowing from the decedent's decreased or lost chance of
survival.108
The compensation approach proposes two ways to value dam-
ages."09 Under the "single outcome method,"110 the plaintiff's com-
pensation is based on the percentage chance-of-survival the victim
would have had with proper diagnosis and treatment multiplied by
the compensable value of the victim's life had he survived."' The
value of the patient's life is based on such factors as age, health, and
earnings.""
The second method of valuing damages is the "expected value"
103. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
104. See Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 400, 471 A.2d 405, 411 (1984). The Evers
case involved a related concept called "increased risk of recurrence." In a case involving in-
creased risk, the physician's negligence causes the patient an increased risk that the illness will
recur at some point in the future. See supra note 13. For examples of other increased risk
cases see Davis v. Gravis, 672 S.W.2d 928 (1984); Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d
618, 640-41 (1974) (Neely, J., concurring); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517
P.2d 675 (1973).
105. James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
106. See King, supra note 2, at 1382.
107. Id.
108. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 632, 664 P.2d at 485 (Pearson, J., concurring).
109. See King, supra note 2, at 1382-84.
110. Id. at 1382-83.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1383. Professor King provides the following example based on his single
outcome formula. For example, a plaintiff blinded by defendant's negligence would proceed as
follows:
Initially, the trier of fact would determine the most likely time of onset of blind-
ness. Assume that if blindness does result in the future, the most likely age of
onset for this particular plaintiff would be age fifty. Assume further that if
blindness does occur at age fifty, the loss attributable to that condition would be
one hundred thousand dollars [$100,000]. Because, however, it is not certain
that the injury will result in blindness, it would not be appropriate to award the
full one hundred thousand dollars [$100,0001. If the probability that the injury
will result in blindness at any time is thirty percent, one might value the chance
at thirty thousand dollars [$30,0001.
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or "weighted mean" computation."' This method computes a
weighted average of all possible outcomes based on the likelihood of
their occurrence, and then adds these totals up to arrive at a value. '"
These three approaches embody the current methods to evaluate
cases involving loss of chance. Each approach, however, involves
drawbacks. These approaches should be carefully analyzed so that
the preblems inherent in each can be recognized and avoided.
IV. CROSS-ANALYSIS
Three major themes run through the current approaches to loss
of chance cases: the application of traditional causation principles
and standards of proof, the role of the jury, and policy considera-
tions. A thorough analysis of loss of chance must include an evalua-
tion in terms of these themes.
A. Causation Principles and Standards of Proof
1. Traditional Approach
The traditional approach adheres to well-established causation
principles."" This approach requires actual cause to be shown by
the "but for" test and to be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. '1 6 Because no recovery for the lost chance itself is allowed, a
case involving loss of chance must be brought as a wrongful death
action.11 As such, in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must
show that but for the doctor's misdiagnosis, the decedent probably
would have survived." 8 The application of traditional causation
113. Id. at 1384.
114. Id. Professor King provides this example to explain his expected value formula:
[Aissume, in an admittedly oversimplified set of facts, that as a result of lain
accident there is a 25% chance of the onset of injury-induced blindness occurring
at fifty years of age, a 4% chance at forty, a 1% chance at thirty, and a 70%
chance that such blindness would never result. Assume further that these are the
only possible outcomes. Finally, assume that if blindness occurs at age fifty the
loss would be $100,000; if at age forty, $200,00; and if at age thirty, $300,000.
Under the expected-value approach, the chance would be valued by aggregating
the possible outcomes discounted to reflect their degree of likelihood. Thus, we
would add $25,000 (25% of $100,000), $8000 (4% of $200,000), $3000 (1% of
$300,000), and $0 (70% of 0), giving a total value of the chance of injury-
induced blindness of $36,000.
Id.
115. Id. at 1365-68.
116. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. See also Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra
note 4, at 138.
118. B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, supra note 31, at 147.
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principles thus can prevent the plaintiff from recovering damages de-
spite the defendant's negligence.
No conceptual problems exist with this approach; it is faithful
to established causation principles. However, strict adherence to
these principles unfairly denies compensation to plaintiffs who have
suffered an injury." 9 These plaintiffs have been deprived of a benefit
due to the defendant's negligence. They should not be denied redress
simply because their injury is somewhat less tangible than those in-
juries involved in traditional negligence cases. Moreover, this ap-
proach is arbitrary. 20 A plaintiff whose lost chance rises above the
applicable standard of proof can be compensated. Yet, a plaintiff
with the identical injury (the lost chance), but whose specific degree
of lost chance is not greater than fifty percent cannot be compen-
sated. The plaintiffs ability to recover damages, therefore, hinges on
the fortuitous timing of his physical examination. If he happens to
be misdiagnosed by his doctor during the earlier stages of his disease,
his chances of recovering damages are greater than if he is misdiag-
nosed during the later stages. Such random and arbitrary results
cannot be justified.
2. Substantial Possibility Approach
Strict adherence to causation principles is less important under
the substantial possibility approach than under the traditional ap-
proach. 2' The substantial possibility approach applies the substan-
tial factor test to the actual cause question' 22 and allows the issue of
causation to go to the jury on a lower standard of proof. 2 This
approach attempts to mitigate the harshness of the traditional ap-
proach by easing the plaintiffs evidentiary burden. 12 4 Many courts
support the relaxed actual cause test and its lower standards of proof
because of policy considerations.'2 5
Despite its appeal, the substantial possibility approach is also
inadequate because it offends traditional causation principles. The
substantial factor test was designed primarily for specialized situa-
119. See Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 4, at 138.
120. See King, supra note 2, at 1376-77.
121. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 613-17, 664 P.2d at 476-78; Hamil, 481 Pa. at
264-73, 392 A.2d at 1284-86. See generally King, supra note 2, at 1368-69 n.53.
122. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
124. See Hamil, 481 Pa. at 267, 271, 392 A.2d at 1285, 1287; Hicks v. United States,
368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966); Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 613-17, 664 P.2d at 477-78.
125. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 664 P.2d at 491 (Doliver, J., dissenting). See
generally King, supra note 2, at 1368-69 n.53.
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tions in which the "but for" test would allow each defendant to avoid
liability. 26 It should not be used in all circumstances.11 7 The sub-
stantial factor test was meant to apply only when the conduct of each
defendant alone would be sufficient to cause the plaintiff's harm. 12
When an injury would have occurred notwithstanding the defend-
ant's conduct, by definition, the defendant's acts cannot be a substan-
tial factor in causing that injury.' 29 Thus, in a loss of chance setting,
a doctor's negligence cannot be a substantial factor in causing a pa-
tient's death if the patient would have died anyway. 30 Moreover, the
substantial factor test was not designed to be used when the victim is
one of the causes of the injury.'"' In effect, application of the sub-
stantial factor test in loss of chance situations distorts traditional cau-
sation principles.
The lower standard of proof used in the substantial possibility
approach also offends traditional causation principles.'8 2 This ap-
proach allows a loss of chance case to go to the jury upon a showing
of a possibility of actual cause. According to traditional causation
principles, such a showing should result in a directed verdict for the
defendant.' 83
3. Compensation Approach
Those who argue that a loss of chance should be a separate
cause of action need not distort traditional causation principles. They
126. W. KEETON, D. DOBas, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, supra note 15, § 41, at 267.
See Smith, supra note 33, at 223-29.
127. W. KEETON, D. DoBss, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, supra note 15, § 41, at 267-
68.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 268; Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 638, 664 P.2d at 491 (Brachtenbach, J.,
dissenting); Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. 1967).
130. "A defendant's tort cannot be considered a legal cause of plaintiff's damage, if that
damage would have occurred just the same even though the defendant's tort had not been
committed." Smith, supra note 33, at 312. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 638, 664 P.2d at
489; W. KEEOrON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & 1). OWENS, supra note 15, § 41, at 267-68.
131. The pre-existing illness of the plaintiff is a cause of the injury. See Herskovits, 99
Wash. 2d at 638, 664 P.2d at 489 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). See generally W. KEETON,
D. DoBK, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, supra note 15, § 41, at 267-68.
132. See King, supra note 2, at 1377.
133. [The plaintiff) must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for
the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant
was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of such
causation is not enough; and when . . . the probabilities are at best evenly bal-
anced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R, KEETON & D. OWENS, supra note 15, §41, at 269.
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simply redefine what constitutes the-injury."3 4 The loss of chance
itself, rather than the death of the patient, constitutes the injury. The
compensation approach requires that the lost chance be established
by a preponderance of the evidence.' 35 Thus, if the jury finds that
the doctor's negligence probably caused the decedent to lose a chance
of recovery, the plaintiff can recover damages for that injury." 6 No
deviation from traditional causation principles occurs.
At the same time, fairness to the plaintiff is maintained.13 7 The
plaintiff is justly compensated for the injuries he incurred. He is not
barred from recovery by rigid causation principles. This approach is
appealing because it follows traditional causation principles and, at
the same time, promotes fairness to the plaintiff.
B. Role of the Jury
The three approaches also differ with respect to the roles of
jury and judge.'3 ' In an ordinary negligence case, the jury alone de-
termines causation." 9 Moreover, the jury values the damages
awarded to the plaintiff.' 40 It values damages based on both the evi-
dence presented and on its collective conscience. 4' However, a loss
of chance case is not an ordinary negligence case. 42 Consequently,
the three approaches assign different functions to the jury.
1. Traditional Approach
Under the traditional approach, the plaintiff must introduce
enough evidence to establish that the defendant's misdiagnosis proba-
bly caused the victim's death. 43 The judge determines whether the
plaintiff's evidence is sufficient.'" If the judge decides the evidence is
insufficient, he directs a verdict for the defendant.' 45 However, if the
134. See generally King, supra note 2, at 1394-95.
135. See King, supra note 2, at 1394-95.
136. Id. at 1371-72.
137. For an explanation of the actual cause test used by this approach, see supra note
100.
138. While the role of the judge is not an independent theme in loss of chance ap-
proaches, the judge's role is one aspect of the function of the jury. Thus, the judge's role will
be discussed when it is affected by the function of the jury.
139. See J. DOOtLEy, MODERN TORT LAW § 8.02, at 226 (1982).
140. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 16, at 62.
141. Id. § 16, at 64.
142. See Hamil, 481 Pa. at 269, 392 A.2d at 1286-87.
143. See supra note 60.
144. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN supra note 15, § 37, at 237.
145. Id.
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court determines that the evidence is sufficient, the case goes to the
jury.""6 The jury then decides whether the defendant should be held
liable, 147 and if so, it determines the amount of compensation." 8 The
plaintiff's damages are valued by the jury based on the evidence
presented and the jury's conscience.1 4
Under the traditional approach, no conceptual deficiencies exist
regarding the role of the jury. Because this approach does not view a
lost chance as a separate injury, the role of the jury is the same as in
any negligence action.' 50
However, under the traditional approach, conceptual deficien-
cies regarding the role of the judge can result in unfairness to the
plaintiff. Under this approach, the role of the judge can operate to
effectively bar the plaintiff from reaching the jury. The plaintiff is
required to prove actual cause to the court's satisfaction. 5' As a re-
sult, plaintiffs who cannot meet the rigid actual cause standard are
denied compensation for the harm they suffer. Thus, although the
jury functions normally, the end result is unfair to many plaintiffs
who are also negligently deprived of a chance of survival.
2. Substantial Possibility Approach
The jury's role in determining actual cause under the substan-
tial possibility approach is considerably different from its role under
the traditional approach. The differences arise from each approach's
view of a loss of chance injury. The traditional approach does not
consider the lost chance to be a special type of injury."' The sub-
stantial possibility approach, on the other hand, views a loss of
chance as falling within Restatement (Second) of Torts section
323(a). 5 ' Applying Restatement section 323(a) allows the jury to
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to constitute actual
cause.' 4 In effect, section 323(a) relaxes the degree of certainty the
146. Id. § 45, at 320.
147. See id. at 319-21.
148. See supra note 140.
149. See supra notes 140-41.
150. W. KEErON, D. DoBBs, R. KEErON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 36, at 235.
151. The plaintiff is required to prove that the victim probably would have lived but for
the defendant's negligence in order to reach the jury. See supra note 6. Plaintiffs whose
chances of survival were less than 50% when the negligence occurred are not allowed to re-
cover any damages. These plaintiffs cannot even take their case to the jury. See supra note 53.
152. See King, supra note 2, at 1365.
153. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
154. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 613, 664 P.2d at 476; Hamil, 481 Pa. at 269, 392
A.2d at 1286.
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plaintiff must normally show in order to reach the jury.155
If the plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence to establish that the
doctor's negligence resulted in a loss of chance of recovery for the
patient, the substantial possibility approach allows the jury, not the
court, to make the connection between the lost chance and actual
cause. 56 The court, presumably, cannot take the case away from the
jury by determining that the evidence of actual cause is insuffi-
cient.' 57 Moreover, some courts hold that if the jury finds that actual
cause has been established, the necessary proximate cause require-
ment is automatically satisfied.'5 8 Finally, once the jury determines
that the defendant is negligent, it values damages by the same
method used under the traditional approach.
The substantial possibility approach always allows the plaintiff
to reach the jury on the issue of actual cause. As a result, more in-
jured plaintiffs are compensated under this approach than under the
traditional approach.' 59 While this outcome is desirable, the substan-
tial possibility approach distorts the traditional function of the jury
in order to achieve fairness for the plaintiff. Furthermore, this ap-
proach does not consider a lost chance to be a separate, compensable
injury.60 Consequently, many plaintiffs with loss of chance injuries
remain uncompensated because they cannot establish actual cause.
3. Compensation Approach
In cases involving a lost chance of recovery, the compensation
approach considers the lost chance to be the injury and compensates
that loss directly. 6' Consequently, the role of the jury under this
approach is different in some respects from its role under the other
two approaches.
Because the lost chance itself is the injury, the jury's role in
determining actual cause is not different from the jury's role in an
ordinary negligence action,"' The jury decides if the doctor's negli-
gence is probably the actual cause of the patient's loss of chance.1 63
155. Hamil, 481 Pa. at 269, 392 A.2d at 1286.
156. Id. See Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 180, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508,
511 (1974).
157. No cases involving non-suits for failing to establish actual cause have been reported
in substantial possibility jurisdictions.
158. Hamil, 481 Pa. at 272, 392 A.2d at 1288.
159. See King, supra note 2, at 1368 n.52.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 96.
162. See King, supra note 2, at 1395.
163. Id.
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The court presumably reserves the right to non-suit if the court finds
that the plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to establish actual cause.16'
In this way, the compensation approach assigns traditional functions
to the jury.
However, the role of the jury in valuing compensation differs
considerably from its role under the two other views. Under the
other two approaches, as in all negligence cases,'" 5 the jury assesses
damages based both on the evidence presented and on its collective
conscience." Under the compensation approach, although the jury
decides whether to award damages, the valuation of those damages is
done "within specific guidelines and parameters set by the court."' 7
The jury is given a set of figures that represents the calculated value
of the decedent's life."' The jury must then multiply this figure by
the percentage chance of survival which was lost in order to arrive at
a compensation figure.' 69
Problems exist, however, because the formulas17 0 used to value
the plaintiffis damages are complex and may be confusing to the
jury. 7 ' These formulas are rigidly mathematical.' 72 A probability
expert would be required to testify about the particular formulas
used to determine the valuation figures.'7 3 Furthermore, these valua-
tion methods are inappropriate at the trial level because the figures
used to compute the value of the victim's life are highly specula-
tive. 1' Finally, the jury is not free to disregard these figures and
value the chance using alternative methods. 57  Thus, the jury be-
comes a "rubber stamp." This distorts the traditional role of the jury
and is the major drawback of this approach.
164. See id. See also supra note 100.
165. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
166. Id.
167. See King, supra note 2, at 1382.
168. See id. at 1393-94; supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
169. See King, supra note 2, at 1393-94. See also supra notes 110-14 and accompanying
text.
170. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
171. See King, supra note 2, at 1385.
172. Professor King admits that his more precise, "expected value" concept involves "a
virtually unlimited number of permutations that would have to be weighted before they could
be aggregated to arrive at the value of the chance." King, supra note 2, at 1384.
173. See King, supra note 2, at 1385 n.106.
174. See King, supra note 2, at 1383-84. Professor King never really describes how the
expected value of one's life is calculated. The figures in his hypothetical are chosen arbitrarily.
He proposes no method to calculate the figures that he provides. In any event, these figures
cannot be calculated with the degree of accuracy which is necessary to implement King's
proposals.
175. See generally id. at 1381-82.
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C. Policy Considerations
The final theme running through the three approaches to the
loss of chance issue involves policy considerations. At the root of the
differences between the three approaches are policy considerations
which should not be underestimated.
1. Traditional Approach
Courts generally embrace the "but for" test and the preponder-
ance standard in an attempt to limit potential injustice. 171 If a case
reaches the jury without sufficient evidence that the physician's neg-
ligence caused the decedent's death, unjust verdicts may result.17 7 Li-
ability could be imposed in many instances involving a patient who
would have died even if the doctor had not been negligent. Thus,
many courts find that fairness supports adopting the traditional
approach.
Moreover, the traditional approach finds no reason to "derogate
well-established and valuable [causation] principles. 17' 8 The use of a
strict level of causation deters frivolous lawsuits and avoids placing
blame on a doctor merely because he fails to find a cure.1 "
While this approach is consistent with traditional causation
principles, it is inconsistent with other tort principles and values. Li-
ability for tortious conduct deters people from acting negligently and
encourages them to act carefully. 80 The traditional approach sub-
verts this deterrence objective of tort law 81 by allowing the defend-
ant to insulate himself from the consequences of his actions. 8
176. See Herskotits, 99 Wash. 2d at 642, 664 P.2d at 491 (Brachtenbach, J., dissent-
ing); Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 251-52, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
177. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 642, 664 P.2d at 491 (Brachtenbach, J., dissent-
ing); Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 251-52, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
178. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 251, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
179. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 637-38, 664 P.2d at 488-89 (Brachtenbach, J., dissent-
ing) Justice Brachtenbach stated:
The physician serves a vital function in our society, a function which requires
the assumption of a duty to the patient. Yet, his profession affords him only an
inexact and often experimental science by which to discharge his duty. More-
over, the tendency to place blame on a physician who fails to find a cure is
great.
Id.
180. Liability is imposed on those whose negligent conduct injures another. The imposi-
tion of liability for tortious conduct serves to deter people from acting negligently. See Rosen-
berg, supra note 38, at 861 & n.51; Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1980).
181. See King, supra note 2, at 1377.
182. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 616, 664 P.2d at 477.
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Finally, the traditional approach fails to properly allocate
losses.' 88 When a physician's conduct causes a loss of chance, the
traditional approach allows compensation only if the lost chance is
the cause of death.'84 As a result, many victims are not compensated
for their lost chances. In effect, the loss is allocated to the victim
rather than to the tortfeaser. This failure to properly allocate these
losses "undermines the whole range of functions served by the causa-
tion-valuation process and strikes at the integrity of the tort system
of loss allocation."' 85
2. Substantial Possibility Approach
The substantial possibility approach emerged because of dissat-
isfaction with the traditional approach. 8 Many courts blamed cau-
sation standards for the problem of unfairness to the plaintiff. Con-
sequently, these standards were adjusted.1 7
Under the substantial possibility view, the defendant cannot in-
sulate himself from the consequences of his actions.' 88 This approach
encourages physicians to use greater care than they might use under
the other two approaches because the risk of liability is greater.
Thus, this approach is consistent with the deterrence aspect of tort
law.' 89
Although this approach to loss of chance seems conceptually ap-
pealing, it too raises a number of problems. The substantial possibil-
ity approach manipulates and distorts traditional causation princi-
ples. 190 It misapplies the substantial factor test and allows the case to
reach the jury on less than a preponderance of the evidence. The
distortion of the causation analysis leads to confusion in the law.
Because the substantial possibility approach fails to recognize
loss of chance as an independent compensable injury, the allocation
of losses under this approach is no more fair than it is under the
traditional approach."' The substantial possibility view often fails to
183. See King, supra note 2, at 1377.
184. See supra note 50.
185. See King, supra note 2, at 1377.
186. See generally Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 613-14, 664 P.2d at 476.
187. See Hamil, 481 Pa. at 270-71, 392 A.2d at 1287-88; see also King, supra note 2,
at 1368-69 & n.53. See also D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 41 (1973).
188. Hamil 481 Pa. at 271, 392 A.2d at 1287; Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626,
632 (4th Cir. 1966).
189. See supra note 81; Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 616, 664 P.2d at 477.
190. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
191. King, supra note 2, at 1368 n.52, 1377-78.
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compensate for a lost chance.19 Moreover, in many instances, the
substantial possibility approach allocates losses less efficiently than
does the traditional approach. The defendant is often held liable for
the wrongful death of a patient who would have died notwithstand-
ing the defendant's negligence. In these situations, the defendant
must compensate the plaintiff for the death of the victim rather than
just for the loss of chance. The substantial possibility approach thus
allows a few more plaintiffs to reach the jury than under the tradi-
tional approach, but at the expense of fairness to the defendant and
strict conformity to traditional causation principles.
3. Compensation Approach
Many of the same policy considerations underlying the substan-
tial possibility approach are embraced by advocates of the compensa-
tion approach. Both views are responses to dissatisfaction with the
traditional approach. 9 Both views encourage compensation for vic-
tims' losses 9" and, through deterrence, they discourage negligent
conduct."' The differences between the two views lie in the imple-
mentation of these policies. The substantial possibility approach
eases the causation test and lowers the standard of proof so that the
plaintiff can reach the jury more easily. The compensation approach,
on the other hand, allows the plaintiff to recover for the loss of
chance itself.
The two views also differ in that the compensation approach is
consistent -with other traditional tort principles. It requires actual
cause to be established by a preponderance of the evidence.'9 ' This
approach efficiently allocates losses.197 It determines exactly what
was lost and compensates that loss accordingly. Moreover, this ap-
proach is equally fair to plaintiffs and defendants.'98 It does not sub-
192. Plaintiffs who are deprived of only a relatively small chance of recovery will not
reach the jury in most instances. However, some plaintiffs who have lost more substantial
chances will have greater odds of reaching the jury. See King, supra note 2, at 1368 n.52.
193. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text; King, supra note 2, at 1376-78.
194. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text; King, supra note 2, at 1363-64.
195. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text; King, supra note 2, at 1377.
196. See King, supra note 2, at 1377-78.
197. Id. King states: "A failure to allocate the cost of these losses to their tortious
sources undermines the whole range of functions served by the causation-valuation process and
strikes at the integrity of the tort system of loss allocation." Id. at 1377. See W. KEETON, D.
DoBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, § 1, at 5-6, § 4, at 21; Rosenberg, supra
note 38, at 877. But see Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward A Test For Strict Liability in Tort, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (advocating the loss to fall on the cheapest cost avoider).
198. The defendant is subject to liability only to the extent necessary to compensate the
lost chance and its related injuries. At the same time, the plaintiff is not barred from recover-
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ject the defendant to unnecessary liability;19 ' yet it compensates
plaintiffs for their losses. Thus, this approach achieves fairness for
both plaintiffs and defendants without offending traditional causa-
tion principles.
Policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of establishing a
separate cause of action for compensating a loss of chance. Problems
arise, however, in implementing these policies. The compensation
approach sacrifices practicality in an attempt to attain mathematical
accuracy.200 Moreover, using the jury to rubber-stamp complex
mathematical probabilities which it may not understand"0 1 distorts
the traditional jury function, making the compensation approach
unattractive.
V. PROPOSAL
The problems associated with each of the current approaches
demonstrate that a new approach is warranted. Such an analysis
must preserve the benefits of the current approaches and avoid their
deficiencies. It must equitably compensate victims and their families
for harm suffered without unfairly subjecting physicians to unde-
served liability. The new approach must be consistent with existing
causation principles and tort policies. Finally, it must be practical at
the trial level.
A. Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of Chance
The compensation approach views the loss of chance itself as
the injury and compensates the victim for his injuries. At the same
time, it allocates losses in an equitable manner. However, this ap-
proach is impractical and complex.202 It sacrifices workability and
practicality for alleged accuracy. Consequently, no reported decision
has adopted the compensation approach.2"' Nevertheless, the idea of
compensating the loss of chance directly is the best solution to the
loss of chance problem and it should be adopted in a modified form.
ing his legitimate losses by rigid, inapplicable causation requirements. See King, supra note 2,
at 1360.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. But cf Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 625-32, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J., con-
curring) (Justice Pearson advocates adopting Professor King's compensation approach). "ITIhe
best resolution of the issue before us is to recognize the loss of a less than even chance as an
actionable injury." d. at 630, 664 P.2d at 487.
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Currently, several situations exist involving medical malpractice
in which a cause of action for loss of chance can and should be ap-
plied.20 4 A lost chance cause of action should be applied to those
medical malpractice cases in which science has developed fairly accu-
rate mathematical estimates for chances of recovery.205
For example, misdiagnosis of heart disease and cancer are espe-
cially suitable for a loss of chance cause of action. The medical com-
munity's sophistication concerning these illnesses is increasing.
Moreover, early detection of these illnesses is very important in lim-
iting their severity.206 The increasing volume of knowledge concern-
ing cancer makes it easier and simpler to detect the disease.2 0 7 It is
now possible to determine the growth rate of cancer and to differen-
tiate specific stages of harm.'0" Experts can now testify, with a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty, about information relating to
loss of chance: when the cancer could have been detected by a rea-
sonably prudent physician, when the cancer metastasized, 210 at
what stage the cancer was in when the doctor failed to diagnose it,"
1
how serious the cancer was when the diagnosis was finally made,' 1 '
the injury caused by the growth of the cancer as a result of the lack
of proper care,' 8 and the chance of survival which was lost as a
result of the malpractice.
14
204. Professor McCormick's theories were originally designed for contract cases. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 117-23; Professor King's theories are not designed to be limited
to medical malpractice cases but are designed to be applied to all situations in which chance
can be valued. See King, supra note 2, at 1354.
205. This effectively means that primarily only cancer and heart disease cases fall
within this criteria. However, this solution is designed to account for medical science advances
and if other illnesses later become susceptible to quantification of chance, they too may be
included.
206. S. REGALIS & H. F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
234 (1982). See also AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC., FACTS ON BREAST CANCER* 14
(1982); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., THE BREAST CANCER DIGEST (1980).
("The real hope for the future is in earlier detection .... At present, the key to saving more
lives from . . . cancer is earlier detection and treatment.") (cited and quoted in Evers v. Dol-
linger, 95 N.J. 399, 424-25 n.3, 471 A.2d 405, 419-20 n.3 (1984)).
207. S. REGALIS & H.F. WACHSMAN, supra note 208, § 14.4, at 233-36.
208. Id. §§ 14.2-14.3, at 236-41.
209. See Evers, 95 N.J. at 404, 471 A.2d at 408; 99 Wash. 2d at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
210. S. REGALIS & H.F. WACHSMAN, supra note 208, at 236-38.
211. Id. at 238-41.
212. See SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS 707, 710 (1982) (quoted in Evers,
95 N.J. at 424-25 n.2, 471 A.2d at 419 n.2).
213. See Evers, 95 N.J. at 404-405, 471 A.2d at 408; Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 612,
664 P.2d at 475.
214. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 612, 664 P.2d at 475. See also Evers, 95 N.J. at
405, 471 A.2d at 408 (expert testimony as to increased risk of recurrence); see supra note 104.
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Establishing a cause of action for loss of chance in these types of
cases will benefit both medical science and patients. Early diagnosis
of cancer enhances the patient's chance of survival. 1 Establishing
liability for loss of chance of recovery will motivate doctors to closely
scrutinize any symptoms of these diseases and will encourage them
to be more careful and thorough in their examinations. Thus, in sit-
uations in which it is more likely than not that the decedent died as
a result of his illness, but was deprived of a chance of recovery due
to the defendant's negligence, suit should be brought under a loss of
chance cause of action.
However, in situations in which it is more likely than not that
the defendant's negligence actually caused the victim's death, plain-
tiffs should not be allowed to bring a loss of chance cause of action.
Wrongful death statutes provide such plaintiffs with an adequate
and efficient means of procuring compensation.21 Finally, when it is
unclear before trial whether the doctor or the pre-existing illness
caused the injury, the plaintiff should be allowed to plead both
causes of action in the alternative. If the plaintiff is pleading in the
alternative, the jury, when charged, should be instructed that if they
find that the doctor's negligence caused the death, they may award
full wrongful death compensation. However, if they find that the de-
cedent's pre-existing illness actually caused the death, but he was
deprived of a measurable chance of survival, they can only compen-
sate the plaintiff for the lost chance.
Creating a loss of chance tort under the foregoing conditions
properly allocates losses by allowing the plaintiff to recover for inju-
ries suffered. These conditions avoid subjecting the defendant to un-
warranted liability. In addition, a loss of chance cause of action
under these conditions is consistent with the deterrence aspect of tort
law because the tortfeasor is not permitted to escape liability when
he harms someone.
B. Causation: Create an Inference of Loss of Chance
Traditional causation principles should be applied in a loss of
215. "Most specialists in clinical cancer feel very strongly that the earlier one makes
diagnosis of cancer, the greater is the chance for cure." CLINICAL ONCOLOGY FOR MEDICAL
STUDENTS AND PHYSICIANS 33 (P. Rubin 3d ed. 1970-71) (cited and quoted in Evers, 95
N.J. at 424-25 n.2, 471 A.2d at 419 n.2); see CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4 (J. Horton and G. Hill
eds. 1977).
216. However, in jurisdictions which have no wrongful death statute, the plaintiff
should be able to bring a loss of chance action. Compensation in this situation should amount
to full wrongful death damages.
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chance tort. This would avoid the drawbacks of the substantial possi-
bility approach without impairing the plaintiff's ability to reach the
jury. Thus, the plaintiff should be required to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that but for the doctor's negligence, the pa-
tient would not have suffered a loss of chance. This showing will
almost always require expert medical testimony, which is consistent
with the existing requirements of proof in any medical malpractice
case. 
21 7
A showing of harm218 should then establish an inference of loss
of chance. This inference would shift the burden to the defendant to
show which damages were caused by the pre-existing condition and
which damages were caused by the physician's negligence. Shifting
the burden in medical malpractice cases is not new.21 In Fosgate v.
Corona,220 the court stated:
Where the malpractice involves treatment of a pre-existing
disease, the assessment of damages poses a problem, because of
the practical difficulty in separating that part of the harm
caused by the malpractice from the pre-existing disease and its
normal consequences. Because of this, courts are now taking the
view that in a situation where malpractice or other tortious act
aggravates a pre-existing disease or condition, the innocent
plaintiff should not be required to establish what expenses,
pain, suffering, disability or impairment are attributable solely
to the malpractice or tortious act, but that the burden of proof
should be shifted to the culpable defendant who should be held
responsible for all damages unless he can demonstrate that the
damages for which he is responsible are capable of some reason-
able apportionment and what these damages are. 1
217. D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 7.02 (1985); J. WALTZ
& F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 54-56; B. SHARTZEL & M. PLANT, supra note 31, at
130.
218. For a view that it should be considered common knowledge that injury results from
delayed treatment, see Evers, 95 N.J. 399, 426-27 nn.2-6, 471 A.2d 405, 419-20 nn.2-6 (Han-
dler, J., concurring).
219. See Matsumoto v. Kaky, 484 P.2d 147 (Hawaii 1971) (in which the plaintiff with
a pre-existing disease condition suffered injuries from defendant's negligence, and damages
resulting from disease and injury could not be apportioned, defendant was be liable for the
entire amount of damages); Graham v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 995 (1970) (dentists, whose negli-
gence allowed plaintiffs pre-existing disease to spread to a more serious stage, had burden of
apportioning which damages were attributable to his negligence); Mudd v. Dorr, 574 P.2d 97
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (sponge left in patient after surgery creates rebuttable presumption of
negligence); Beaudoin v. Watertown Mem. Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166 (1966)
(shifting of burden of proof in res ipsa loquitur cases).
220. 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974).
221. Id. at 272-73, 330 A.2d at 358.
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The inference of a lost chance prevents defendants from using
the nature of the injury to insulate themselves from liability. Thus, it
is consistent with both the deterrence and allocation functions of tort
law. Moreover, the inference of loss of chance preserves the concep-
tual integrity of traditional causation analysis.
C. Allow the Jury to Determine Damages
In applying the proposed loss of chance approach, the jury
alone should determine compensation. The jury should be allowed to
weigh the evidence and apply its common sense to determine com-
pensation for the plaintiff. This jury function is consistent with the
jury's traditional role. Moreover, this allocation of jury functions is
practical at the trial level because the use of complex probabilities
and speculative statistics will be unnecessary.
Furthermore, the damages awarded by the jury under this pro-
posal are no less accurate than under the compensation approach.
The compensation approach forces the jury to multiply and add
figures provided by witnesses and the court. 2 The value of a per-
son's life cannot be quantified beyond any reasonable degree of cer-
tainty."28 Thus, any evaluation will be arbitrary. The arbitrary fig-
ure of a jury is preferable to the arbitrary figure of either the
plaintiff's or the defendant's paid witnesses. In addition, appropriate
jury instructions can remind the fact-finders that they are compen-
sating only the lost chance of recovery and not the wrongful death of
the victim.
The jury will value loss of chance damages in the same way it
values damages in ordinary medical malpractice cases. As a result,
economic evidence pertaining to loss of wages should be presented to
the jury. Evidence of pain and suffering, emotional distress and other
intangibles should also be presented. However, in valuing the loss of
chance itself, juries will have to take into account the specific facts
and circumstances surrounding the case. Such factors should include:
the grievousness of the malpractice, the age, health and family of the
patient, his prospects for recovery had there been no negligence, the
simplicity of the procedures which would have detected the injury
and various other intangible information which the jury deems
relevant.
Historically, the jury determines the size of compensation
222. See King, supra note 2, at 1382-84.
223. Id.
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-awards in personal injury suits,22 and, in many instances, these
awards have involved intangible damages.2 25 In addition, the civil
litigation system provides the inherent safeguards of trial level mo-
tions and appellate review2 26 to monitor the size of jury verdicts.
Therefore, no reason exists to remove this traditional jury function.
With respect to damages, the plaintiff should not be restricted to
any particular type of compensation. For example, if the jury finds it
difficult to quantify the lost chance, it should still be allowed to
award compensation for pain, suffering, mental anguish, unnecessary
medical expenses, and so forth. Similarly, if other damages are too
speculative, the jury should be allowed to award compensation only
for the loss of chance and not for other losses. The amount of dam-
ages should be left to the jury's discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing approach can be applied to the hypothetical de-
scribed in the introduction. Mrs. Olsen's estate will be able to reach
the jury on her claims for damages, including the nineteen percent
lost chance of recovery, if expert testimony establishes that she was
harmed by the doctor's negligence. This testimony will establish an
inference of loss of chance and shift the burden of apportioning dam-
ages to the negligent defendant. The jury has the discretion to deter-
mine the amount of the recovery. The proposed approach will ade-
quately compensate victims and their estates for losses suffered. It
will equitably allocate losses, without exposing physicians to unwar-
ranted liability. This new approach is consistent with traditional
causation principles and the traditional function of the jury, and, it is
practical at the trial level.
Jonathan D. Wolf
224. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 6, at 24-28.
225. Id. §§ 26-27, at 99-104.
226. Such motions include judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for a new
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